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Introduction
The United Nations Development System (UNDS) consists of a large number of specialized 
UN agencies, funds, and programs, each having its own mandate, governing boards, and 
business practices, as well as regional and country offices. Many reform proposals over 
the past sixty years have offered solutions, but implementation has been sporadic. This is not 
because UNDS lacks intelligent and capable officials but because it is so organized that effec-
tive managerial direction is very difficult. As Jackson said in his diagnosis of the system and 
its reform in 1969, “In other words, the machine as a whole has become unmanageable in the 
strictest sense of the word. As a result, it is becoming slower and more unwieldy, like a pre-
historic monster”1 (Jackson 1969). In 2006, a new reform proposal was put into practice that 
addressed the UN System’s problem of ineffectiveness and incoherence. Entitled “Delivering 
as One and UN System-Wide Coherence,” the reform was defined from a bottom-up perspec-
tive. The underlying idea was that system-wide coordination should be guided from the 
country level and not a top-down prescription by the UN General Assembly.
This paper aims for two objectives. First, it tries to analyze the complex reform process 
of Delivering as One at the country level, followed by system changes at a later stage. To 
explain the emergence of new norms and the transition, we apply a theoretical framework 
that Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink had developed in 1998 to explain political 
change: The Norm Life Cycle (NLC). Guided by the research question of how the Deliver-
ing as One reform process came into existence, I will analyze each NLC stage in detail and 
generate some propositions about the origins of the new norms, the mechanisms by which they 
exercise influence, and the conditions under which those new norms become so influential 
that they change business as usual. Moreover, I will study the role of norm entrepreneurs, 
norm leaders, norm messengers, and message entrepreneurs, and make use of the organi-
zational platforms that Finnemore and Sikkink proposed in order to explain the complexity of 
the UN System and the negotiation dynamics among the stakeholders. The platform analysis 
supports my arguments in favor of the need of a fourth stage of the NLC when it comes to 
global systemic changes, such as within the United Nations Development System.
The paper starts with a quick recall of Finnemore and Sikkink’s Norm Life Cycle 
model, followed by some overall considerations for norm emergence within global systems. 
Then it undertakes a detailed analysis of the NLC of the UN Reform “Delivering as One and 
UN System-Wide Coherence.” Empirical research was conducted among the actors already 
mentioned above as well as among concerned institutions and diplomatic missions in New 
York. The evidence informs the analysis and supports the hypothesis being tested. My thesis 
is that the analysis of the “Delivering as One and System-Wide Coherence” reform should 
reaffirm the three stages of the Norm Life Cycle that Finnemore and Sikkink developed 
to explain the emergence of issue-based norms, while at same time, I hope to demonstrate 
1. Sir Robert Jackson, op. cit. Vol. I, Foreword, page iii.
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that an additional stage is required before norm shifts get internalized in global systems. 
Thus, the second and even more ambitious objective of this paper is to make the case for a 
four-stage Norm Life Cycle model and, therefore, stimulate new discussions and empirical 
research among norm researchers and IR scholars.
Finnemore and Sikkink’s Norm Life Cycle: An Issue-Based Approach to Explain the 
Emergence of New Norms
Finnemore and Sikkink’s Norm Life Cycle (1998) is one of the most recognized theoretical 
frameworks to explain the emergence of new norms and norm shifts. Interested in empirical 
research on social construction processes and norm influences in international politics, both 
scholars studied the conditions under which norms influence world politics. Their research 
is driven by questions such as where do norms come from and how do they change? What 
are the roles that norms play in political change, both the ways in which norms, them-
selves, change and the ways in which they change other features of the political landscape? 
Finnemore and Sikkink propose to understand norm influence as a three-stage process: norm 
emergence, norm cascade, and internalization.
The first stage, norm emergence, is characterized by persuasion. Norm entrepreneurs, the 
thinkers and creators of new norms, try to convince a critical mass of states to agree on and 
implement new norms (norm leaders). The second stage involves broad norm acceptance by 
those concerned. Norm leaders advocate for and try to socialize other states to become norm 
followers. The first two stages are divided by a “tipping point,” which refers to a critical mass 
of states or state actors adopting the new norm. The last stage, internalization, is reached 
when new norms have gained a taken-for-granted status and are no longer subject to debates. 
While Finnemore and Sikkink make the case that “norm change is characterized by differ-
ent actors, motives, and mechanisms of influence” (p. 895), they also argue that the “world 
time-context” may hinder or facilitate norm change (p. 909). World historical events, such 
as the end of Cold War or the 2008 financial and economic crisis, as well as Global Summits, 
such as the 2000 World Summit that led to the adoption of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), may intensify the search for new ideas and norms. With the increased inter-
connectedness of today’s globalized world, new ideas and norms spread rapidly and create 
new prospects. Over the past twenty years, the Norm Life Cycle has been used to explain the 
emergence of international social norms, such as international human rights norms and their 
The Norm Life Cycle according to Finnemore and Sikkink
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integration into domestic practices (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), humanitarian interven-
tion (Finnemore 1996), women’s rights (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), and construction of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2009). What those 
researchers have in common is their focus on the emergence and development of interna-
tional social issue-based norms. With the International Declaration on Human Rights and the 
ratification by UN member states of specific human rights conventions, human rights norms 
became universal standards. The MDGs are a similar case. At the 2000 World Summit, the 
international community agreed on eight MDGs as global priorities for the next international 
development cooperation agenda. The MDGs with their well-established targets and indica-
tors became the first evaluable global framework that allowed monitoring and measuring the 
progress made in the implementation of the new globally established norms at the country and 
regional level.
Norm Emergence within Global Systems
In addition to issue–based norms there are also organizational norms that emerge or shift 
within different global settings or time contexts. Organizational norms usually emerge to 
either improve the effectiveness of activities or those of processes. For example, they can 
emerge with the intention to coordinate actors of social networks, transnational networks 
or any other social network setting, and to streamline their activities. Organizational norms 
may also be institutionalized; they may help organize social behavior and the functions of 
human agency within an institution. Internal human resource rules are an example, and 
organizational norms also emerge to improve internal work flow processes. There are two 
components here: The first sets rules for human behavior while the second aims at improv-
ing the effectiveness and efficiency of work processes.
When calls for either norm shift appear, negotiations between the management and the 
governing boards of such global institutions can become complex. A relevant example is the 
UN Development System that consists of almost all of the UN specialized agencies, funds and 
programs. There are currently thirty-one full member organizations and seventeen observer 
entities that make up the UN Development Group (UNDG). Its mandate is to coordinate 
UNDG members’ country and regional development activities2 to ensure coherence among 
the different UN agencies. Over the past ten years, UNDG has developed and standardized 
new operational norms, rules, and procedures that help UN Country Teams3 to cooperate and 
engage in jointly planned programs and other activities. This norm shift is the result of the UN 
reform “Delivering as One and System-Wide Coherence” that launched a vast reform of the 
existing organizational standards at the country and system-wide level in 2006.
Why and how did this reform process come into existence at this time, given the fact 
that over the past sixty years calls for reforming the UN system were repeatedly placed on the 
negotiation agenda of the UN General Assembly? Already in the early 1960s, voices raised 
to point out systemic problems within the UN System, and since then quite a good number 
of reform proposals4 have been placed on the negotiation agenda of the UN General Assem-
bly. So what is the “Delivering as One and System-Wide Coherence” reform process about? 
How did this reform process generate new organizational norms? What precisely are these 
new operational norms, and how were they implemented? Was there a special momentum that 
facilitated the norm shifts, and who were/are the actors? To answer these questions, I examine 
the characteristics of each stage of the reform process through the lenses of Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s Norm Life Cycle framework. Special attention will be paid to norm leaders and norm 
2. UNDG; https://undg.org/home/about-undg/members/.
3. A UNCT is constituted by UN agencies present in a given country (sometimes non-resident agencies are also linked to it).
4. Jackson Report (1969), Pearson Report (1969), Gardener Report (1975), Brandt Reports (1979, 1983), USA (1978, 1996), Nordic  
Countries (1991, 1996), The Urquhart and Childer’s Proposals (1990, 1001), Stanley Foundation (1991), Ford Foundation (1993, 1995), 
Scanteam Proposal (2005).
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entrepreneurs whose activities are supported by norm messengers and message entrepreneurs. 
While the former are central to the task of promoting the acceptance of specific norms, the 
latter are those who play a lead role in mobilizing consensus around the new norms (Fukuda-
Parr and Hulme 2009).
The Norm Life Cycle of the UN Reform “Delivering as One and UN System-Wide Coherence”
Norm Emergence
Since the creation of the UN in 1945, the inefficiency and ineffective cooperation among the 
UN and its specialized agencies, funds, and programs developed into a chronic illness. Due to 
the increased UN membership of poor and troubled decolonized countries during the 1950s, 
1960s, and 1970s, the UN was forced to respond to the development needs of the emerging 
developing world, starting with what was named as the United Nations’ First Development 
Decade (1960–69). Although the provision of significant amounts of development assistance 
was clearly not part of the founders’ original vision, development policy became increasingly 
important and led to the creation of new UN bodies and funds and programs. In addition, the 
Cold War’s bloc politics led to the creation of parallel mechanisms or additional bodies and 
left the UN system with many entities including bodies within the Secretariat, regional enti-
ties, research organizations, and numerous specialized agencies, funds, and programs. While 
some shared an interest in working together, others preferred to operate independently. This 
often resulted in competition for human and financial resources and strategic influence among 
the member states. Moreover, the uncoordinated diversity of member states’ own strategic 
agendas hampered the coordination among the UN agencies’ governing boards and effec-
tive implementation of the agreed upon development objectives at the country level. A good 
number of diverse reform proposals from experts, governments, and civil society5 have been 
discussed over time, but no detailed consensus was found on what exactly was to be done and 
how to make it happen. This situation remained until the breakthrough of the “Delivering as 
One and UN System-Wide Coherence” reform in 2006. What drew the UN membership to 
accept this reform proposal and what dynamics emerged out of it?
According to Finnemore and Sikkink, “change is characterized by different actors, motives, 
and mechanisms of influence” (p. 895) as well as world time-context (p. 909). The actors, 
Finnemore and Sikkink call them norm entrepreneurs, may play different roles according to the 
underlying dynamics of the three NLC stages. For the first stage “norm emergence,” both argue 
that the characteristic mechanism is persuasion by norm entrepreneurs. Norm entrepreneurs try to 
convince a critical mass of countries (they call them “norm leaders”) to adopt and implement new 
norms. Yet, new norms do not appear suddenly but over a period of time. The norm building pro-
cess itself is nourished by human agency, occurring changes or events that favor the norm building 
process. Norms are developed by agents (norm entrepreneurs) who envision the need for change 
and appropriate and desirable behavior accordingly. These norm entrepreneurs are critical for the 
norm emergence stage, because they point public attention to issues, use strong language to name 
concrete problems, interpret and analyze these problems, and advocate for change. Finnemore and 
Sikkink make reference to social movement theorists and argue that the construction of cogni-
tive frames is an essential component for norm entrepreneurs’ political strategies (they call it the 
process of “framing”). Norm entrepreneurs are successful when the “new frames are understood 
by a broader public and adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding issues” (p. 897). 
Hereby they balance their advocacy between appropriateness and interest for change. A chang-
ing political environment may challenge the existing logic of appropriateness, which over time 
becomes “inappropriate.” Proposals for new frames and new norms become an alternative; their 
appropriateness starts competing with existing norms and a broad range of underlying interest.
5. Jackson Report (1969), Pearson Report (1969), Gardener Report (1975), Brandt Reports (1979, 1983), USA (1978, 1996), Nordic 
Countries (1991, 1996), The Urquhart and Childer’s Proposals (1990, 1001), Stanley Foundation (1991), Ford Foundation (1993, 1995), 
Scanteam Proposal (2005).
THE NORM LIFE CYCLE OF UN REFORM     |      29
The changing political environment made the reform of the UN system become an emer-
gency. The collapse of the Communist system and emerging conflicts as a consequence para-
lyzed the functioning and working mechanism of the UN agencies, which had adapted over the 
past decades to the two-block context. Because of the lack of balance within the international 
system and political disorientation, the agencies, funds, and programs were left without clear 
guidance by their member states. The duplication of program activities during the Cold War 
became a major hindrance for UN agencies, which, on the one hand, had to respond to a vast 
increase in demand for services due to the increased number of conflicts during the immediate 
post–Cold War period, while on the other hand, they suddenly found each other competing for 
resources. Because of their independent mandates and lack of political leadership by their 
member states, the agencies engaged in strong political lobbying among their own mem-
ber states to win over other UN agencies to the implementation of their programs in their 
member states. This competition, orchestrated from the agencies’ headquarters, was largely 
played out at the country level. The representatives of the agencies, funds, and programs, once 
nominated and having presented their credentials to the government for accreditation, had a 
direct link to line and sectoral ministries. With no interest for cooperation with their “sister 
agencies,” the country representatives presented their programs, often especially developed 
for a particular country, as well as the budget they would put into it, to negotiate directly 
with government representatives the signature of and the implementation of their programs.
At the same time, each of the country offices begged funding from agencies, and in 
particular, bilateral donor missions that operated in developing countries based on bilateral 
development aid agreements. When funding was made available to UN agencies by the 
donating Western countries, UN agencies had to consider and incorporate the donors’ stra-
tegic funding priorities into their program activities. Based on political interest, development 
funding was, and still is, discussed and approved by the donor countries’ parliaments before 
being promoted by their ministers of foreign affairs among developing countries. The diverse 
political priorities of a large number of donor countries was not only a headache for the gov-
ernment but also supported the competition, and even political and programmatic division 
among the UN agencies (horizontal), which translated into headquarters’ political and stra-
tegic program development (vertical). Because UN programs were supply-driven rather than 
demand-driven and could not meet the expectations of the developing countries, they were 
more and more seen as ineffective, inefficient, and not relevant. Moreover, their competition 
for donor funding decreased their independence and effective program implementation. The 
situation looked different from the perspective of developing countries. Because of their lack 
of political authority and institutional capacity, these governments were unable to handle the 
competing interests of donors and multiple UN agencies and their vast programs at the same 
time. This coordination challenge put an additional burden on developing countries’ shoulders.
Empirical research has shown that only for environmental issues, twenty UN entities had a 
stake in the area of fresh water, eleven in the area of marine coastal environment/ocean/flood, ten 
in climate activities, five in air pollution, six in energy, eleven in biodiversity, two in chemistry, 
eighteen in desertification, fourteen in urban and rural land use, eight in early warning (e.g., 
tsunamis), five in small island states, five in environmental law, five in environmental educa-
tion, and thirteen in environmental emergency issues (Richter 2007). Imagining the burden for 
governments when handling requests from seventeen specialized agencies and related organiza-
tions, fourteen funds and program, seventeen departments and offices of the UN Secretariat, 
five regional commissions, five research and training institutes, and a plethora of regional and 
country level structures, although not operating equally at country level at one time.6
There is no wonder that developed and developing countries raised their voices and called 
for reforms to make the UN system more effective. Money was wasted in excessive admin-
6. Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel “Delivering as One.” New York: United Nations, 2006, 15.
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istrative costs due to the duplication of activities and fragmented country program delivery, 
and developing countries called for higher responsiveness to country needs (demand-driven), 
more effective program delivery, and decrease of the coordination burden for their own gov-
ernment administration. This call was backed by the agreements reached from the preceding 
aid effectiveness negotiations. With the 2003 Rome Declaration, countries both developed 
and developing acknowledged the need for aid transparency and collaboration. The 2005 Paris 
Declaration went beyond and fixed aid cooperation commitments around five principles: own-
ership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability. Reforming 
the UN development cooperation system simply followed what the Finnemore and Sikkink 
called the logic of appropriateness.
When taking office in 1997, Kofi Annan responded to the UN memberships’ call for 
bold structural and managerial reforms to modernize the UN working methods and ratio-
nalize efforts, capacities, and funding. In Annan’s report “Renewing the United Nations: A 
Programme for Reform” (1997), he revealed a new vision for reform with more effective 
management of the UN Secretariat, funds, and programs, and a new leadership and man-
agement structure.
What is most striking is the emphasis on coherence of operational activities at the country 
level. Under article 49 and 50 of the report, and entitled “Acting as One at the Country-Level,” 
Annan spells out that “(a) all too often, the separate United Nations entities involved in these 
activities pursue their activities separately, without regard to or benefiting from one anoth-
er’s presence. The greater unity of purpose and coherence in performance that these strategic 
management initiatives accomplished at headquarters level must also be reflected in the field.” 
Moreover, next to the UNDG, which was established in 1997 in New York and comprised 
four founding New York-based ExCom Agencies UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and WFP (they 
had agreed to common country planning methods to jointly support the government and other 
partners to develop their own country programs), the secretary-general asked the remaining 
specialized agencies, funds, and programs to establish similar consultative and collabora-
tive arrangements at the country level to provide the government with a coherent overview 
of the programs being performed by the various agencies in their own countries. To this end, 
the “country-level assistance provided by each United Nations programme and fund should 
be integrated into a single United Nations Development Assistance Framework” (UNDAF).
In addition, the secretary-general proposed that all UN agencies with field missions 
operate in common premises, which he called the “UN House.” “In countries where there 
is a Resident Coordinator, all funds and programmes as well as United Nations Information 
Centres should become part of a single United Nations office under the leadership of the 
Resident Coordinator.” This was an attempt to reduce administrative costs by means of cost-
sharing. Annan’s intention was multi-fold. On the one hand, he tried to push the agencies 
for stronger collaboration and transparency in program implementation while at the same 
time streamlining their planning efforts into one single program framework, the UNDAF, 
would help make duplications visible during the planning phase. On the other hand, he was 
also aware of the distinctiveness and specific focus of the work of each agency, which, if 
wisely used could be turned into complementarity rather than competition. In this vein, he 
recommended to retain the UN agencies specific mandates but invited member countries 
of the four ExCom agencies to explore ways of “facilitating more integrated oversight by, 
for example, convening joint committees and/or consecutive meetings of their respective 
Executive Boards.” The idea behind was that “joint planning exercises” of these four agen-
cies” would require the delegates (members of UN permanent missions in New York) to sit 
in the four executive boards at the same time. This would enable them to develop the same 
level of understanding and get a broader overview of the complexity of country planning 
mechanisms and execution of programs, and, thus, decrease counterproductive decision-
making by member states.
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The establishment of the UNDAF in nearly each country can be considered one of the key 
results of Annan’s reform agenda on operational activities at the country level. A second achieve-
ment is the establishment of the “Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review of Operational Activi-
ties for Development of the UN System” (TCPR)—now quadriennial. Designed as a policy 
control tool for ECOSOC, every four years it brings UN member states and the UN agencies, 
funds, and programs together to take stock on progress made and to review the policies and stra-
tegic programs from a global perspective. The three years interval was initially considered as an 
appropriate period that would enable all participants to detect problems and correct them in time, 
preventing shortfalls and unnecessary loss in funds. After several iterations, it was decided to 
implement it every four years. For the first time, a direct reporting line was established between 
the country and global level. The entrepreneurial vision for a more effective UN system was suc-
cessfully put in practice by Annan and the UN Secretariat, which laid the foundation for a more 
substantive reform process in the years to come.
Besides bilateral negotiations with donor and aid recipient countries, as well as UN 
agencies’ headquarters, Annan and the UN Secretariat used the UN General Assembly as an 
organizational platform (Finnemore and Sikkink, 899/900) to advocate for these new organi-
zational frameworks, UNDAF and the TCPR, because the majority of the UNGA membership 
is needed to approve norm shift. Yet, even though the UNDAF brought more transparency to 
the country programing process, it did not prevent the different agencies from backing donors 
and competing for funding. It did not stimulate the various country offices to collaborate and 
work together to save costs or make program delivery more effective. Each country office 
continued negotiating its part directly with the government counterpart without searching for 
synergies that could have benefited two or more agencies and the government. Unsatisfied, 
the UN member states again placed the effectiveness problem on the top of the negotiation 
agenda. The G77, the Non-Alighted Movement (NAM), and the EU started exhaustive nego-
tiations on the different issues subject to reform. 
Overall, the main concern for developing countries was that the reform agenda would 
be used by donor countries to divert the regular budget funds reserved for development to 
other ends, such as peace and security. Their main interest was to ensure that resources would 
be applied in an equitable way. Both the G77 and NAM strongly opposed proposals that 
could be understood as imposing conditionality on aid, for example human rights and gender, 
which in the eyes of the developing countries represented a “double standard” by donor coun-
tries and which they considered issues that donor countries often pursue more vigorously in 
developing countries than at home (Freiesleben 2006).
Developed countries on the other hand, especially the EU, rejected these indictments 
and the division of conditionality on aid. They rather argued that voluntary funding finances 
development. Indeed, developing countries are the principal receivers of large amounts of 
financial aid via voluntary contributions, which often surpassed the UN and its agencies’ 
regular budgets. Nevertheless, developing countries in general considered voluntary contri-
butions as funds that developed countries spent according to their own priorities (supply-
driven) rather than to those of the developing countries (demand-driven). The north-south 
mistrust was at its peak with the south believing northern countries would like to take con-
trol over country-level activities, which was the reason why the G77 negotiated toward a 
broader “package decision” and not each issue one by one.
Discrepancies and disagreements also occurred among the countries belonging to the G77 
and NAM—mainly between larger and smaller or medium-sized countries. While the former 
pursued a broader UN development agenda with centralized decision-making on development 
issues in the General Assembly, the latter was focusing on how to improve and streamline the 
burdensome services of UN agencies at the country level. Smaller, aid-dependent countries 
complained about the demanding and incoherent procedures when dealing with thirty to forty 
agencies at a time; larger countries, less dependent on aid, focused on using their resources to 
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benefit as much as possible from the fragmentation of the UN system. Despite the different 
interests and viewpoints, the UN member states reached consensus and signed the World Sum-
mit Outcome Document (A/RES/60/1) in September 2005 that was to strengthen the overall 
reform efforts of the UN. They called for UN system-wide coherence (A/RES/60/1, para 168) 
and invited the secretary-general “to launch work to further strengthen the management and 
coordination of the United Nations operational activities so that they can make an even more 
effective contribution to the achievements of the internationally agreed development goals, 
including proposals for consideration by Member States for more tightly managed entities in 
the fields of development, humanitarian assistance and the environment.”
Norm Entrepreneurs
At this point, a new norm entrepreneurship initiative started. In response to the request of 
member states, Annan appointed eminent personalities and experts to serve the “High-level 
Panel on System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and 
the Environment.” Learning from past experience, the responsibility for the norm creation 
and norm entrepreneurship was “outsourced” to prominent people with different professional 
backgrounds (three co-chairs, ten development experts and two ex-oficio: UNDP and IFAD) 
and from different countries and regions. The choice of the norm entrepreneurs was informed 
by two struggles of balance. First of all, a balanced regional presentation was critical to make 
sure that each region created a sense of belonging and ownership over the process.
The experts’ role was to provide specific technical input, share experience from the past, 
and raise awareness of the special circumstances and needs of their regions. However, the 
choice of the co-chairs was not only guided by regional representation but also by political 
purpose. With Prime Minister of Pakistan Shaukat Aziz representing the Asian region, Prime 
Minister of Mozambique Luísa Dias Diogo the African regions’ interests, and Prime Minister of 
Norway Jens Stoltenberg the donor community, the opposing political interests of the different 
regional groups within the UN membership were fully included and considered at the highest 
level of the panel. The fact that the most controversial opinions were included in the panel dis-
cussions obliged the panel members to find a compromise; at the same time it avoided the risk 
of blocked negotiations by those who had felt left out.
Co-Chair and former Prime Minister of Mozambique Mrs Luísa Dias Diogo, for example, 
held meetings with three groups present at the UN General Assembly level: African Group, the 
G77, and the SADC. During an interview, she said,
So, one of the things I did was to meet Africa; show my face to Africa. It was not an 
easy decision. My representatives in New York said “Madam Prime Minister, how are 
you going to face the Africa Group as a Co-Chair?” “Lets go, I have to listen to them 
rather now than later.” Fix it now! And I knew that not all the demands are the demands 
that you make. But at least I would know that I am representing their voice in their 
minds; and I went to the Group of 77. 
During the interview, Diogo pointed to extremely controversial opinions on how to 
reform the UN system. Advocated by Gordon Brown, a couple of panel chairs shared the idea 
of merging all institutions into one single organization and having only one fund as financ-
ing instrument. Brown’s logic was simple and guided by the quest for effective management. 
Countries would have only one interlocutor to deal with and money would be spent in a more 
transparent way. Yet, Diogo underlined UN agencies’ mandates and the programs they tailor 
to a specific country: “When one knows the mandate, one analyzes the country the country can 
say what it wants, and joint discussion follow to define a program in a country, and from there 
you put the money. You put the expertise, you put the know-how, or if you don’t have, you go 
to the world and you get the know-how. This is the way how the United Nations works. They 
have the network of knowledge, they organize the knowledge, bring the money and they do 
in the country.” UNICEF’s work on children is programed under an emergency perspective, 
THE NORM LIFE CYCLE OF UN REFORM     |      33
while UNFPA focuses on the development and well-being of populations from a different 
angle. Both approaches are valid and well-received by benefiting countries.
The panel defined its work from Terms of References they had received from Annan and 
started a broad consultation process that included not just issue-based consultations (environ-
ment, humanitarian assistance, gender). They also met with the executive heads of Rome- and 
Geneva-based agencies, UNESCO, and major financial institutions. Meetings with country-
level practitioners were organized to study business practices, the funding system, and the 
resident coordinator system. Regional consultations, including Regional Economic Commis-
sions, as well as consultations with the civil society and the private sector were organized to 
cover the complexity of the UN System’s work and that of partners involved.
Despite the controversial approaches at the beginning, the members of the High-Level 
Committee reached consensus and submitted an outcome document entitled “Report of the 
Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on System-Wide Coherence: ‘Delivering as One’” 
(2006). In that report, the panel provided “a framework for a unified and coherent UN struc-
ture at the country level [. . .] matched by more coherent governance, funding, and man-
agement arrangements at the centre” and laid out steps on how to implement a fundamental 
restructuring of the organization. “Delivering as One” and the systemic fragmentation is the 
central theme of the report. Its recommendations focus change “in the way the UN operates at 
headquarters, regional, and country level” and places center stage “performance, efficiency, 
accountability, results within the UN system, and the enhanced role and voice of developing 
countries.” To this end, the panel recommended, among others, the establishment of the ONE 
UN with new organizational norms and principles such as One Programme, One Budget One 
Leader, and One Office (where appropriate).
The One Programme is the unique program document that UN agencies, funds, and pro-
grams plan together against the development priorities defined in the national development 
plan. In contrast to the UNDAF under which all UN agencies, funds, and programs indicate 
the kind of assistance they provide to the government, the One Programme brings all mem-
bers of the Country Team together under one nationally owned strategy that draws on the full 
range of UN expertise. Under the leadership of the UN resident coordinator, the UN Country 
Team plans together to create a set of strategic results based on national priorities, including 
the internationally agreed development goals, such as the MDGs. In addition, the programing 
is underpinned by integrated policy positions and services, and real-time monitoring through 
joint work plans and joint evaluation plans. The outcomes are listed as measurable with costed 
outputs resulting from UN support to national partners.
Under the One Budget, the UN Country Teams agree on cost results and present it in one 
financial framework. In other words, the One Budget shows each agency’s planned financial 
input together with the funding source. Unfunded results are also identified and open for fund-
raising or extra-budgetary contributions. Each participating UN agency identifies the resources 
it expects to provide—whether in-kind or monetary—subject to funds being available. At the 
end of the year, agencies and government departments provide information on progress made 
against the planned results and actual expenditures to give governments a clear picture of UN 
support. Under the One Leader concept, the resident coordinator is expected to provide strategic 
leadership throughout the development programing process. While each agency retains author-
ity and accountability over the use of agency resources, they respect the resident coordina-
tor’s role and guidance and support to the UN Country Team during program implementation, 
including mobilizing additional resources. The resident coordinator is held accountable by the 
government of the results produced by the UN Country Team. The One Office describes the use 
of common services, common premises, as well as harmonized, simplified, and unified busi-
ness policies and procedures that help UN Country Team members work together. The purpose 
of One Office is to increase efficiency, decrease transaction costs and produce savings that in 
turn can be spent on programmatic development work. By physically and functionally bringing 
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everyone together, the One Office is supposed to achieve greater economies of scale, improve 
collaboration among UN agencies, and present a unified UN image at the country level.
Norm Leaders
Although the recommendations of the “Delivering as One” High-Level Panel were widely 
discussed and welcomed by the majority of the UN member countries, no concrete action 
was taken to start the implementation process. Neither Secretary-General Kofi Annan nor the 
UN membership engaged in reform activities until the arrival of the newly elected Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon. Four months after the release of the “Delivering as One” report, on 
3 April 2007,7 Ban Ki-moon announced his “broad support” to the recommendations of the 
High-Level Panel, and restated the panel’s focus on the need of “overcoming fragmentation 
and bringing together the system’s many assets.” He endorsed the “One UN” project, includ-
ing the central idea of national ownership, underlined the importance of results-based per-
formance, pointed to the authority and accountability of the resident coordinator, and of the 
overall coordinating role of the UNDP.
Nevertheless, because there was still a good number of reform skeptical countries that 
might have blocked the complex negotiations for approval via a UNGA resolution, a more 
pragmatic solution was found: Use norm leaders. As sovereign countries have the primacy over 
making decisions on how to govern their own countries, a couple of reform-friendly countries 
proposed to volunteer and implement the One UN norms and principles. The pilot initiative 
was supported by reform-interested donors (Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom), which allowed the creation of a special implementation fund, One UN 
Fund, for each pilot country to finance the transaction costs (Independent Evaluation, Main 
Report 2012). What we can see here is that the norm entrepreneurs, who promoted the new 
norms among the members of the UN, are joined by norm leaders, namely those who took on 
the lead to make the case for the appropriateness of “Delivering as One’s” new norms. These 
characteristics correspond to those described by Finnemore and Sikkink when elaborating 
on the norm emergence stage: norm entrepreneurs, the thinkers and creators of new norms, 
socialize and try to convince a critical mass of states to implement new norms (norm leaders).
In January 2007, eight pilot countries8 started implementing the “Delivering as One” 
reform (DaO) on a voluntary basis, and almost all started with the One Programme and 
One Budget. Under the leadership of the resident coordinator (One Leader), all UN agen-
cies (via their representatives in the country) programmed their country activities into the 
“One Programme” and respective financial resources into “One Budgetary Framework” in 
line with the jointly identified financial needs of the One Programme. The latter is planned 
against the development priorities that countries had already fixed in their national strategic 
development plan—thus both planning documents are structured around the same thematic 
clusters. This enables governments and donors to understand which agency supplies what 
kind of expertise, resources, and financing to support which particular thematic cluster. 
Transparency of the planning process and a clear division of labor among the government, 
donors, UN agencies, and nongovernmental partners were key factors to bring and keep all 
stakeholders on board.
Norm Cascade
Norm Followers
The norm leaders’ role is to implement the new norms and make the case for their appropriate-
ness. The implementation process itself is an experiment for which no receipt exists. As the 
7. A/61/836, 3 April 2007.
8. Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Vietnam. These countries, well advanced with the aid  
effectiveness agenda [country ownership, harmonization and alignment (country coordination mechanisms), mutual accountability, results], 
are also representing a regional balance.
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country context and development priorities varied from pilot to pilot country, communication 
and exchange on issues of concern became a crucial factor for successful norm shift. The pilot 
countries implemented the One UN norms over a period of five years, from 2007 to 2012. 
Annual High-Level meetings were organized by the governments of the pilot countries to 
share lessons learned and best practices among the pilots and with other involved or inter-
ested stakeholders. Interestingly, the earlier meetings held in Maputo (21–23 May 2008) and 
Kigali (19–21 October 2009) brought only the governments of the Delivering as One countries 
together as well as resident coordinators and some representatives of the UN Country Teams. 
A couple of self-starter countries also joined the Kigali meeting as observers. The following 
meetings held in Hanoi (16 June 2010), Uruguay (8–10 November 2011) and Tirana (27–29 
June 2012) were attended by an increasing variety of stakeholders:
Hanoi: Governments of DaO countries and self-starter countries, resident coordinators 
and UN Country Teams of DaO countries, and representatives of donor governments.
Uruguay: Representatives of thirty governments, resident coordinators and UN Country 
Teams of DaO countries, representatives of donor governments, technical experts, and 
numerous representatives from different multilateral organizations.
Tirana: Representatives of forty countries, including governments of pilots, self-starters, 
resident coordinators and UN Country Teams of DaO countries and self- starters, countries 
interested in adopting the DaO approach or learning about it, international donor commu-
nity, Regional Economic Commissions (RECs), UN senior staff, as well as civil society.
The “Delivering as One” meetings were organized by the pilot countries themselves to 
which all interested stakeholder groups were invited. This diplomatic “socialization process” 
convinced new countries (self-starter countries) to adopt and implement the new “One UN” 
organizational norms; it increased the critical mass of countries implementing the One 
UN norms up to a point that would make the norm shift process irreversible. This emerg-
ing dynamic can be explained by what Finnemore and Sikkink call the “contagion effect”: 
The influence of norm shift becomes more and more important and incites other countries to 
become norm followers (p. 902). Indeed, already in 2008, one year after the pilot countries 
decided to implement the One UN principles, a group of self-starter countries engaged in the 
same change process. Having eight pilot countries was enough to serve as a critical mass that 
would appeal to other countries. Also, the balanced geographical representation of the pilot 
countries played in favor of “regional contagion.” As of 2016, fifty-four countries put into 
practice the One UN principles9 (UNDG 2016).
The implementation of the “Delivering as One” approach in pilot countries was supported 
by a specific number of donor countries. With the rising number of reform-seeking countries, 
the donor communities in those self-starters suddenly became concerned as did other program 
implementation partners, such as the civil society and the private sector. New donor countries 
joined the original donor group that pushed for and financed the norm shift transition in the 
pilot countries. The “contagion effect” went in two directions: a) new self-starter countries, 
and b) drowning donor communities. No wonder that the number of signatories of the final 
outcome documents increased with each “Delivering as One” High-Level Conference.
A second tipping was reached when both the “Delivering as One” and self-starter coun-
tries constituted a critical mass of countries that up-streamed norm shift and influenced the 
policy frameworks and organizational settings of the region to which they belong. This 
explains the interest of the Regional Economic Commissions (RECs) in the “Delivering as 
One” reform process and their attendance at the Tirana High-Level Conference in 2012. Con-
9. https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Delivering-as-One-countries_May-2016.pdf.
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vened annually by the RECs, Regional Coordination Mechanisms10 (RCMs) aim to improve the 
coordination among the work programs of UN entities and their partners at the regional level. 
Generally speaking, the overall mandate of the RCMs is to foster inter-agency coordination 
at the regional level through two main activities: 1) executive-level meetings to interpret and 
implement policy-level consensus on opportunities for increased regional cooperation, and 2) 
thematic working groups try to find ways to promote improved regional cooperation on specific 
operational and programmatic issues.
Norm Messengers and Message Entrepreneurs
As the number of countries supporting the “Delivering as One” reform grew, and the 
implementation of the One UN principles went rather smoothly and without any major obsta-
cle, the entire norm shift process at the country level needed to be back-stopped at the global 
level. The negotiations that preceded the consensus reached on the 2005 World Summit 
Document were guided by two camps, those who wanted to reduce the galaxy of UN agen-
cies to a single UN development agency with a single UN Fund (advanced by Gordon 
Brown and followers), and a second camp who pointed to the complexity of human develop-
ment and the different development context and priorities of each country. The supporter of 
the latter camp argued that no will for cooperation and coordination in addition to overhauled 
business practices were the main problem. UN agencies’ mandates and specific expertise 
were regarded as valuable and important to maintain. Undeniably, the “Delivering as One” 
reform and its One UN norms and principles went in favor of the latter camp. Yet, the real 
challenge was to convince the UN membership and reach consensus about whether to accept 
norm shift and the new way of doing business at the country level.
Simultaneous to the High-Level meetings of the “Delivering as One” countries, the 
members of the UN General Assembly looked very carefully at the stocktaking reports and 
10. www.un-rcm-europecentralasia.org/home/the-regional-coordination-mechanism.html.
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outcome documents indicating best practices, lessons learned, and next steps. Several nego-
tiation rounds took place during the period from 2006/7 to 2010/11 with each led by two 
co-facilitators who were nominated by the president of the General Assembly in agreement 
with the UN secretary-general. This negotiation technique corresponds to what Sakiko 
Fukuda-Parr and David Hulme (pp. 4, 8, 14) promote as the concept of “norm messengers.” 
In their paper entitled “International Norm Dynamics and ‘The End of Poverty’: Understand-
ing Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),” both scholars analyze the Norm Life Cycle 
of the MDGs and made the case for a third category of group involved in the norm-making 
process. In contrast to norm entrepreneurs whose task is to create and promote the acceptance 
of new or specific norms, message entrepreneurs frame the new norms and play a leading 
role in mobilizing consensus around them (p. 4). Fukuda-Parr and Hulme further demonstrate 
how message entrepreneurs applied diplomatic skills to promote the MDGs, a selection of 
a reasonably coherent and concise set of norms, in pursuit of an international agreement 
by governments and international organizations (p. 8). They were institutionally embedded 
individuals who were motivated by organizational mandates (p. 14).
It took the UN General Assembly four negotiation rounds, stocktaking, consultation and 
mobilization round, substantive work round, and decision round, to decide on the various 
aspects of the “Delivering as One and UN System-Wide Coherence” reform process. Every 
round had a special objective and working mechanisms and built on the results of the pre-
vious round. The stocktaking round was run only over a few weeks. The High-Level Panel’s 
report “Delivering as One and UN System-Wide Coherence” was issued on November 2016. 
Neither Secretary-General Kofi Annan nor the UN membership engaged in reform activities 
until the arrival of the newly elected Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who publicly announced 
his support to the recommendations of the High-Level Panel on 3 April 2007. On 25 May 2007, 
President of the General Assembly Sheikha Haya Rashed Al Khalifa officially announced he 
had appointed two co-facilitators, Ambassador Hackett of Barbados and Ambassador Hoscheit 
of Luxembourg, with the objective to begin consultations with member states on the recom-
mendations contained in the report of the High-level Panel on System-Wide Coherence on 
development, humanitarian assistance, and the environment. It is important to recall that the 
High-Level Panel made forty-seven recommendations that were organized around eight topics:
1. Delivering as One
2. Humanitarian
3. Environment
4. Gender
5. Human Rights
6. Governance and institutional reform
7. Funding
8. Business Practices
The co-facilitators immediately found themselves questioning “how to go about with 47 rec-
ommendations having only a few weeks left before reporting to the General Assembly?” Informal 
consultations and briefings with the entire UN membership started immediately. Because many 
of the issues raised by the High-Level Panel were not new, a stocktaking exercise was launched 
(a) to identify already existing mandates for specific areas, and b) to establish a route map of 
feasible short-term, mid-term, and long-term objectives and benchmarks for each component. 
Human rights for example is a cross-cutting issue and to be considered in each program. A similar 
situation applies for the environment: There are a large number of environmental treaties, pro-
grams, declarations, and outcomes documents. Given this, it was imperative to understand what 
agreements already existed, in which document they were fixed, and to check if there was a new 
element that the High-Level Panel had recommended, and if so how to contextualize it? Address-
ing the complexity of humanitarian assistance was even more challenging as the coordination and 
collaboration included not only UN agencies but also international NGOs and the private sector.
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The gender issue remained on the check list. It was found that the four independent bodies 
working on the empowerment of women (see footnote 12) approached this issue from different 
perspectives and rather complemented than competed with each other. Merging them into an 
overarching structure would reduce managerial costs and build synergies between the program 
activities. Past experience had shown it was difficult to approach the reform of governance and 
institutions mainly because of the opposing viewpoints between groups of countries pushing 
for effectiveness (Western countries) and those who were concerned of funding cuts and conse-
quently blocked any movement. Hence, the implementation of Delivering as One and its One 
UN principles by pilot countries did not find any opposition. After all, it was a sovereign deci-
sion of the pilot countries to engage in this process and to share the experience after five years. 
There was a general understanding that the lessons learned from the implementation of the One 
UN norms and principles would provide a good basis for negotiations on reforming business 
practices, funding, and governance at a later stage.
The analytical work of the stocktaking round informed the negotiations of the 2007 
Triennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the UN 
system11 (TCPR). Many points raised by the High-Level Panel are reflected in this resolu-
tion that became the route map for the five years to come: funding, gender and empower-
ment of women, transition from relief to development, coherence, effectiveness and relevance, 
regional dimension, business practices, transaction costs and efficiency, capacity-building at 
the country level, and relevant evaluation processes of country level activities.
The second negotiation round, the consultation and mobilization round (2007–08), was 
animated by co-facilitators Ambassadors Augustine Mahiga of Tanzania and Ambassador Paul 
Kavanagh of Ireland. In his letter of 11 January 2008,12 the president of the General Assembly 
addressed the members of the UN and stressed the importance of advancing coherence across 
the UN development activities system and the implementation of the One UN pilot projects. 
Member states were invited to fully cooperate; an invitation was extended later to the UN 
agencies’ headquarters. However, commencing concrete negotiations appeared difficult as too 
many issues at a time could not be digested by the entire General Assembly. The co-facilitators 
opted for a “basket” approach when negotiating the various elements raised by the High-Level 
Panel; they announced the creation of several thematic working groups, such as funding, gov-
ernance, gender, Delivering as One, Harmonization of Business Practices, etc., and invited 
member states to join one or several of those working groups according to their interests and 
capacities. Each working group had its own agenda and a commonly chosen chair handled the 
work program of its group. A deadline was fixed for each group to present its work, and recom-
mendations for consideration of the UN membership, which would discuss and decide whether 
or not to accept it (in the latter case the process would start again on the issues of disagreement).
During that time, both co-facilitators started extensive consultation processes to mobilize 
the actors concerned by the Delivering as One implementation process: governments of pilot 
countries, resident coordinators, UN country teams, and donor countries, as well as the UN 
agencies’ headquarters. They pledged for a new spirit of cooperation and of the advantages of the 
One UN norms and principles on one hand, while on the other hand they reassured the UN agen-
cies’ governing boards and senior managements of the support of the UN membership in New 
York. During January to March 2008, the co-facilitators visited the pilots Tanzania, Cape Verde, 
Mozambique, and Albania; from April to June 2008 visits took place in pilot countries Rwanda 
and Vietnam, as well as in Geneva and Rome-based UN agencies and UNESCO in Paris.
To ensure informed decision-making by the UN membership, co-facilitators Mahiga 
and Kavanagh installed vertical communication lines and invited message entrepreneurs to 
share their experiences and report on the progress made with the One UN norms and principles. 
11.  A/RES/62/208, 19 December 2007
12. www.centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/swc110108.pdf
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Message entrepreneurs are actors that implement the Delivering as One norms at the country 
level. The governments of the pilot countries were regularly invited to share their “country level 
experience” with their peers, and especially the G77 members of which the majority remained 
skeptical about the reform. In addition, informal hearings were organized; resident coordina-
tors and members of the UN country teams shared the progress made in their countries and the 
challenges they had to face. Special sessions with resident coordinators and pilot countries were 
organized during ECOSOC and the General Assembly to keep the reform on the top of the UN 
General Assembly’s political agenda, and thus push for consensus on the items that two resolu-
tions should consider, e.g., two resolutions were approved during the mobilization round: The 
first13
 approved the review of the mandates of the various UN specialized agencies, funds, and 
programs and their thematic focus that had started during the preceding stocktaking round. The 
aim was to ensure that the reform process would take place within internationally approved leg-
islative settings. The second14 focused on Delivering as One and UN System-Wide Coherence. 
The five interrelated axes were considered and recommended to work on: Delivering as One at 
the country level, harmonized business practices, funding, governance, and gender fragmentation.
For the third negotiation round, the substantive work round, General Assembly President 
Ambassador Miguel D’Escoto Brockmann appointed Ambassadors Kaire Mbuende of Namibia 
and Juan Antonio Yáñez-Barnuevo of Spain as co-facilitators of the upcoming negotiations on 
System-Wide Coherence. As the nomination was announced on 20 February 2009,15 only six 
months were left to lead the UN membership through a substantive work process. To do so, 
they requested the help of the UN Secretariat, which delivered three discussion notes: one 
on system-wide coherence and especially the interrelation between the five axes, a second 
paper on the fragmentation of the gender architecture, and a third paper on funding issues. In 
contrast to the basket approach used by the previous co-facilitators, Ambassadors Mbuende 
and Yáñez-Barnuevo opted for a “one by one” thematic approach. Each topic, e.g., gender, 
governance, funding, was discussed by the entire membership until consensus was found.
Yet, because only six months were left to present recommendations to ECOSOC and the UN 
General Assembly, an effective preparation of the thematic sessions was essential. To meet their 
objectives and keep the negotiation process as effective as possible, the co-facilitators: (a) sent 
mass letters to each of the permanent delegations, which included a detailed work plan and the 
“homework” to be done prior to the meetings. The homework consisted of a substantive analysis 
of the secretary-general’s thematic discussion papers, a clear political position of each mission’s 
government and concrete proposals that should be circulated in advance among the UN member 
states for consideration; (b) introduced a “thematic cycle negotiation method” to keep negotiations 
constantly running. Meetings were scheduled nearly every two weeks, with each time focusing on 
a different theme. The advantage of this method was that there was time for background work and 
consultations of permanent missions with capitals before the next meeting on that specific issue 
was scheduled. In the meantime, work continued on other issues and advanced the negotiations 
without delay. For the substantive work round, meetings were scheduled as follows:
System-Wide Coherence (10 March 2009) 
Gender (30 March 2009; 15 April 2009) 
Governance (24 April 2009; 8 May 2009) 
Funding (19 May 2009)
Interactive session with Secretary-General (20 May 2009)
Delivering as One (4 and 8 June 2009) 
Gender (8 June 2009)
Experts session on Funding and Governance (17 June 2009)
Gender (22 June 2009)
13. A/RES 62/278 of 15 September 2008.
14.  A/RES/62/277 of 15 September 2008.
15. www.un.org/ga/president/63/letters/appointmentSWC.pdf.
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System-Wide Coherence (letter 7 August 2009)
System-Wide Coherence (draft resolution sent to member states on 11 September 2009)
The vertical communication lines installed by the previous co-facilitators were kept as 
they appeared useful. Co-facilitators nourished bilateral contacts with individual member states 
and regional groups; experts were invited to ECOSOC session to feed their knowledge into 
intergovernmental negotiations; resident coordinators and UN country teams continued to share 
their experience in Delivering as One pilot countries; and Delivering as One governments regu-
larly provided feedback and shared their views with peers of the G77 group. The substantive 
work round produced one resolution on system-wide coherence16 that approved the merger 
of the four existing UN structures17 working on the empowerment of women into one single 
composite entity on gender, which became the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empow-
erment of Women (UN Women) in 2010. No resolution was searched for the Delivering as One 
process as the implementation continued at the country level. However, the UN Evaluation 
Group (UNEG) had already started in 2007 to think of how to evaluate the Delivering as One 
reform process—so far this norm shift process was unique. Preliminary evaluability assess-
ments for the years 2007 and 2008 were circulated and informed the decision makers during the 
months of the substantive work round.
The last negotiation round, the decision round, was animated by co-facilitators Ambas-
sador Tiina Intelmann, permanent representative of Estonia, and Ambassador Ghazi Jomaa, 
permanent representative of Tunisia. Their job was to continue the consultative process on the 
System-wide Coherence in the course of the 64th session and to lead the UN membership for a 
final decision. To start with, the co-chairs requested the secretariat to produce a strategic discus-
sion paper18 that would outline already accomplished negotiations and information on unsettled 
issues. The idea behind this request was to bring the UN member states at the same level of 
understanding and to build on what has already been decided by the preceding resolution on UN 
System-Wide Coherence (A/RES/63/311). It is a common diplomatic praxis in New York that 
the diplomatic personnel of permanent missions stay no longer than four years, often less. Most 
of the time, incoming diplomats need a warm up period to get used to the UN General Assembly 
negotiation life and procedures. At that time of the year, many roll-overs of diplomatic staff 
happened and created a critical mass of newcomers who needed to get acquainted with the 
topics and negotiation results. The reports provided by the UN Secretariat aimed to bring all 
permanent missions to the same level of knowledge and understanding of the reform process.
As already mentioned, the topics left for final negotiations were those related to system-
wide governance (five axes) and the creation of UN Women. The assessment of the imple-
mentation of the One UN principles was left for an Independent Evaluation team that was 
hired and had already started its work. Here again the preferred methodology was to split 
up the work into thematic working groups. The co-facilitators nominated the heads of each 
working group and charged them with the responsibility to guide the discussions over a fixed 
period of time. By the end, each working group had to submit a draft proposal whose recom-
mendations were debated among the UN member states. Comments made during these special 
thematic sessions were integrated into a new draft document which, at a second time, was not 
only shared among the UN members but also with the UN Secretariat to discuss and integrate 
technical issues. Opposing opinions among particular countries such as Cuba, Egypt, Russia, 
and India had let to stocked positions. As UN members are equal sovereign countries, the co-
facilitators had no power to push or intervene in those countries’ internal affairs. Nevertheless, 
as the number of blocking countries remained limited, the co-facilitators took the freedom to 
16. A/63/311 of 2 October 2009.
17. Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of
Women (INSTRAW), Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues Advancement of Women (OSAGI), and United
Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).
18. A/64/589.
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announce an official deadline for the disagreements among those countries to be solved and 
requested the submission of a joint proposal for the next agenda item.
In order to avoid a patchwork situation where individual countries block negotiations for 
their own interest, the co-facilitators presented a last draft resolution and requested the politi-
cal groups to negotiate among them and present a statement that was supported by all group 
members (Res/A/64/L.56 and A/RES/64/289 of 21 July 2012 on SWC and UN Women). The 
resolution set a milestone with its decision to create a new organization, UN Women. It made 
provisions for the establishment of this new organization, funding, governance, composition 
of the governance board, administration and human resources, and transitional arrangements.
The final outcome was a specific resolution, called Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy 
Review19 (QCPR), which was adopted on 22 January 2013. The QCPR focused on system-
wide coherence and looked at issues such as system-wide arrangements for administration 
and human resources management, financing, and transitional arrangements. With the QCPR 
approval, the members of the UN unanimously supported the Delivering as One approach and 
its new One UN norms. However, no agreement was found to decide on whether or not the 
Delivering as One approach would be considered as the new way of conducting operational 
activities at the country level. At the contrary, the UN membership remained careful and stated 
in article 21 of the resolution20 that it “encourages the Secretary-General to proceed with the 
modality for the independent evaluation of lessons learned from the ‘delivering as one’ 
pilots, . . . and looks forward to receiving the outcome at the sixty-sixth session of the Gen-
eral Assembly.” In other words, after more than four years of implementing the new One UN 
norms in the pilot countries, the status of internalization had not been reached.
19. The QCPR is the mechanism through which the General Assembly assesses the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and impact of UN opera-
tional activities for development and establishes system-wide policy orientations for the development cooperation and country-level modalities 
of the UN system in response to the evolving international development and cooperation environment. In 2008, member states decided to change 
the comprehensive policy review (formerly the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review-TCPR) to a quadrennial cycle, notably to ensure that the 
review guides the development of strategic plans of UN system organizations. A/RES/67/226 of 22 January 2013
www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/289&referer=http://www.un.org/en/ga/64/resolutions.shtm l&Lang=E.
20. www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/289&referer=http://www.un.org/en/ga/64/resolutions.shtm l&Lang=E.
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Stabilization—The Missing Stage before Achieving the Internalization Stage
So far, this study has analyzed the promotion of the One UN norms and principles via 
two organizational platforms: the UN General Assembly and Delivering as One pilot coun-
tries (country level). These platforms were used by norm entrepreneurs, norm messengers, 
and message entrepreneurs to promote the new norms. Organizational platforms can be 
constructions created for a special purpose to which adhere different stakeholders (NGOs, 
transnational networks, etc.) pursuing a specific purpose, or international organizations that 
have purposes and agendas other than just the promotion of a specific norm (Finnemore and 
Sikkink  896, 899). Nevertheless, even though the progress made with the implementation 
of the new organizational norms, the status of internalization had not been reached after 
more than four years. The reasons for are multifold.
First of all, it was a sovereign decision of pilot countries to volunteer and experience the 
implementation of the One UN norms. The objective here was to build cases for such a norm 
shift and also document the different steps, challenges met, lessons learned, and best practices 
for further studies. One could indeed argue that the self-starter countries also contributed sub-
stantially to the discussion on how to liftoff norm shift. Yet, the self-starters made the decision 
to go for norm shift only after a couple of months when the pilot countries had already well 
advanced and it became obvious that the funds made available by a specific group of reform-
interested donors would decline as more countries wanted to join the norm transition process. 
Within a multilateral setting such as the UN, individual experience by a specific member state 
might inform debates but will never be accepted as a prescription to the entire UN member-
ship without unanimously agreed upon terms of a resolution. It should also be noted that while 
seven countries undertook an evaluation of DoA, one, Pakistan, did not. Consequently, no 
internalization stage can be reached at this point.
Second, the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR 2007), followed by the 
resolution on System-Wide Coherence (A/64/289 of 2 July 2010, art. 21,) mandated an inde-
pendent evaluation of the Delivering as One initiative. Moreover, by resolution 64/289, 
the General Assembly outsourced; it endorsed and entrusted oversight of the evaluation to a 
regionally balanced group of evaluation experts. The overall objective of the evaluation was 
“to assess the contribution and the added value of ‘Delivering as One’ and to draw lessons 
learned that are significant for the United Nations system.” Avoiding a comparative assess-
ment of performances across countries, the independent evaluation went for a synthetic 
evaluation of the lessons learned from the pilot experiences and used evaluation criteria such 
as relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.
Generally speaking, the Delivering as One initiative was echoed with positive voices. 
Concerning relevance, the independent evaluation team considered the Delivering as One 
approach and the One UN norms helped the pilot countries better meet their developing needs 
because: (a) both together, the resident coordinators and the respective governments, took the 
lead on the overall programming and coordination. This increased transparency and coherence 
among all stakeholders at the country level (horizontal) as well as with the UN system (verti-
cal). Moderate progress was made in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. The effectiveness 
of Delivering as One was understood as the contribution made to deliver better support to 
countries, development processes, and results—it was assessed as the intermediate state of the 
UN system delivering better support to countries.
The efficiency of Delivering as One was considered weak. First of all, there was no real 
progress made in reducing transaction costs, which is often the case for such important change 
management processes. The independent evaluation team noted that progress lagged owing to 
the limited mandates of country offices to change procedures and incompatible systems across 
UN organizations. Getting into change was time consuming, and support from higher levels of 
the system was often considered inadequate by UN country teams. Moreover, a coherent and 
consolidated management information system did not exist.
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The likelihood of sustaining Delivering as One was assessed as moderate. The evalua-
tion team assessed the sustainability question in terms of the probability of its continuation 
over time and the likelihood of long-term benefits, for both pilot countries and the UN 
system. In this regard, sustainability was considered as a “combination of the extent to which 
‘Delivering as One’ is relevant, efficient and effective and has gained sufficient support at all 
levels in all relevant systems to ensure its continuation, along with its continuing financial 
viability” (para 88). Indeed, the support for Delivering as One within the pilot countries, most 
parts of the UN system, and individual member states was strong; however, the team had 
considerable doubts of the financial sustainability of Delivering as One as key donors had indi-
cated to reduce or discontinue funding for it. Spain for example had been a strong supporter 
and donor for the Delivering as One initiative. Nevertheless, its banking bailouts as result of 
the 2008/9 global financial and economic crisis in addition to the European debt crisis had 
obliged the country to step back its international ambitions. Another case was the UK. The 
Delivering as One initiative got strong support under the leadership of Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown; however, new priorities for multilateral cooperation were formulated when David 
Cameron took office.
Condition for relevance 
respond to country needs and 
priorities
Alignment to countries’
development priorities;
Accept and support county owner-
ship and leadership
IE: yes, strong
Condition for effectiveness and 
efficiency: system-wide vertical and 
horizontal coherence of policies and 
business procedures
Country level—Mechanism: One 
Programme, One Budgetary Frame-
work, One Fund, One Voice, One 
House; UNDAF rollout countries, 
new UNDAF cycles
HQs and CEB level: CL activities 
need to be backstopped at regional 
and HQ/CEB level
On-going process in CEB with
HLCP, HLCM and UNDG
IE: moderate–weak
CL: mechanisms only now
fully in place and start to be 
operational
HQs/CEB: IE identified problems 
and provides recommendations
Condition for sustainability: 
system-wide systemic changes fixed 
by GA,HQ + governing
boards, governance reform
Inter-agency coordination, IPSAS, 
ISWE
Accountability and reporting lines, 
governance reform
IE: Problem Tree and Recommenda-
tions of what needs to be changed
The independent evaluation’s assessment pointed to systemic bottlenecks as key 
problems for the effectiveness and efficiency of the Delivering as One approach. Indeed, 
over the path of several decades, each organization had developed its own financial man-
agement IT solutions, management information systems, accounting standards, human 
resources regulation, which, once operating under the new One UN norms hindered the 
implementation of commonly planned activities at the country level. A simple financial 
transaction from one UN country office to another needed to be approved by headquarters, 
which wired it to the benefitting agency’s headquarter that then needed to wire the funds 
back to the agency’s field office. As each UN organization has its own governance struc-
ture, mandate, and culture, it remained the primary units of account for performance and 
management. Incontestably, voluntary coordination at the country level among a diversity 
of existing systems quickly reached its limits because many high-level systemic elements 
had not been changed for “Delivering as One.” The Delivering as One initiative was 
an experiment; no senior management and governing board would have initiated a vast 
change in corporate management systems before the assessment and evaluation of the 
Delivering as One results.
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Within this context, it becomes evident that a stabilization stage was required to finalize 
the norm shift process. The new One UN norms and principles, One Programme, One Budget-
ary Framework/ (One Budget), One Leader, and One Office, induced all UN agencies’ head-
quarters to adapt and align and find new approaches to planning, budgeting, and reporting.
The post-pilot initiative of Delivering as One (stabilization stage) is characterized by a 
system-wide search for standardization and harmonization of business practices among all UN 
agencies. Mandated by the QCPR resolution (articles 43 to 48), UN agencies were pressed to 
find agreements on system-wide standards for financial transactions, human resources manage-
ment, procurement, information technology, and administration within the UN Development 
System and report back to the UN General Assembly for the next QCPR in 2017. The harmo-
nization process was coordinated through a third organizational platform: the UN Chief Execu-
tive Board (CEB). The CEB is the major inter-agency platform and brings together the thirty 
executive heads of UN organizations to coordinate and align strategies and policy issues. Its 
work is supported by three high-level committees: (a) the High-Level Committee on Manage-
ment (HLCM) focusing on management issues, (b) the High-Level Committee on Programmes 
(HLCP) coordinating policy and program issues, and (c) the UN Development Group (UNDG), 
which is in charge of a coordinated implementation of recommendations made by the HLCP and 
HLCM, and the decisions made by the heads of agencies during the CEB meetings.
Since 2013, important systemic changes took place starting with the system-wide imple-
mentation of International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) and system-wide 
monitoring and evaluation standards developed by the UN Evaluation Group. A new Busi-
ness Operations Strategy was developed in 201421 to fix the rules for joint strategic planning, 
common procurement, logistics and transport, ICTs, human resources, audits, financing, and 
a harmonized approach to cash transfers, as well as the management of common premises. 
At the same time, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and country programming prin-
21. https://undg.org/home/guidance-policies/business-operations/.
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ciples were developed to engage the internalization process of the One UN norms. These new 
guidelines provide for guidance on programing, leadership, business operations, funding, 
and communications for country-level development operations on one hand, while on the 
other hand they guide headquarters through the necessary alignment of policy and procedural 
changes. We can conclude that the stabilization period is characterized by: (a) UN agencies’ 
headquarters harmonization and alignment to the country level change dynamics, and (b) a 
continued growth of countries interested in norm shift.
By the time of writing, UNDG counted fifty-four countries that had decided to shift and 
implement the new One UN norms. Consequently, the pilot countries and self-starters are 
more advanced in the change process compared to those countries that only decided to go for 
Delivering as One after the 2012 QCPR (twenty-four countries). The next QCPR in 2017 will 
assess the entire norm shift process at the country level and the systemic changes that UN 
agencies’ headquarters. Depending on the outcome of the assessments, the UN membership 
will pronounce for or against the internalization of the One UN norms as the new way for 
conducting operational activities in developing countries.
Conclusions
The reform “Delivering as One and UN System-Wide Coherence” is a four-stage, norm shift pro-
cess. The application of Finnemore and Sikkink’s Norm Life Cycle framework helped explain 
the emergence of the One UN norms and principles, the role and contribution of the different 
norm entrepreneurs, norm leaders, norm messengers, and message entrepreneurs as well as the 
self-starter countries. Nevertheless, in contrast to the emergence of global social issue-based 
norms, the emergence of Delivering as One and its One UN norms is a bottom up dynamic 
that went across three organizational platforms at different times. While the norm emergence 
and norm cascade of the Delivering as One norms (One UN norms) show similarities with the 
NLC of issue-based norms, the internalization stage was not yet achieved. The alignment to and 
system-wide implementation of the One UN norms (stabilization) only started after the norm 
cascade, and only at the request of UN member states (2012 QCPR). This evidence shows that 
a fourth stage is needed to manage norm shifts within global systems. The internalization stage 
of Delivering as One and UN System-Wide Coherence will depend on whether the UN member 
states (a) accept the One UN norms and principles as the new way of conducting operational 
activities in developing countries, and (b) approve the system-wide harmonization efforts among 
UN agencies once evaluation has provided evidence. The QCPR in 2017 will be important as it 
decides the value of the entire Delivering as One reform process.
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